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--A key feature of the 600 Ship Navy is the expansion of homeport facilites at
strategic locations on both coasts of the United States. In o'-der to maximize
federal dollars spent on the most mission essentia), aspects of the Homeport
Concept, Congress has urged the Navy to look for alternative; metrors of financing
various supporting functions.
One method under consideration for the New York Horieport is tne "build to
lease" provisions used frequently at European installations. Authorized under
Setion 801 of the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Bill, this concept is running
into difficulty in the United States due to the extrerie high cost of land in the
areas where the installations are being established.
•
One method to encourage local government participation is to justify a cost
Denefit to the local government due to the increased population housed for the
base. If the return is sufficient, the local government can use their authority
to secure land for use at no cost to the federal government. This cost-benefit
study addresses these issues for a proposed housing plan in the highly populated
New York City Metropolitan area. r—
iii
I. OVERVIEW
The objective of this Cost-Benefit Analysis is to estimate the added level
of economic activity and the net fiscal impact on New York City resulting from
a government subsidized lease-construction housing project to support U. S. Navy
families associated with the operation of a new homeport facility.
Strategic Homeporting
The Strategic Homeporting Concept is based on several principals:
7n spec sa l of Forces to more ports and less concentrated ports improves our
defens i vi posture, compl icates conventional warfare targeting by a potential enemy
and minimizes the risks associated with a relatively simply but properly placed
attack. Dispersal provides the divers i ty and mobi li ty needed to support offensive
forward sea control which is the basis of our Maritime Strategy.
Collocation of Ships to form balanced battlegroups provides a trained and
ready team which is prepared to undertake the full spectrum of naval warfare
missions immediately upon clearing the harbor. As inport training opportuni ties
are improved by technology, Battle Group integrity with a homeport can be an
important adjunct to war fighting readiness.
Maintenance of an adequate industrial base by homeporting ships near locations
with existing industrial capacity permits the Navy to take advantage of that
capacity during peacetime, and to surge to wartime production level more rapidly
ft










encourages the shipbuilding industry.
£v Development of additional logistic support complexes is required to support an
expanding Navy and to sustain the forward Mar i time Strategy. Existing bases wi 11
[> continue to be fully utilized while expansion into new ports will provide needed
.- relief for the congested and aging facilities in our traditional ports.
K- I mplementation
Cities in the proposed geographical areas (Northeast, Gulf Coast, West Coast,
and Northwest) were asked to submit homeporting proposals. After consideration
of proposals from Boston, Narragansett Bay region, New York and Bayonne, the
Secretary of the Navy designated Staten Island, New York City, as the "preferred
alternative" for a Battleship Battlegroup (BBBG) . An Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) was completed in February 1985, after which the Secretary of the
Navy confirmed the site for the Northeast homeport. Approximately $188 million
dollars is budgeted for construction from FY 1986 co FY 1989. Additionally, the
Port Author i ty of New York and New Jersey has contributed $15 mi 11 ion dol lars for
waterfront improvements, and transfer of 35 acres of unused waterfront land at a
discounted value. In August of 1986, a Supplemental EIS was completed which
addressed the issue of housing for the military families who support the new
facility. An independent housing survey had found that adequate and affordable
^ housing for Navy families is the New York region would be scarce, and al ternat i ve
is
means of supplying same would be required,
Af fordabi ltiy
Critics have made the argument that the Strategic Homeporting Concept is
expensi ve and wi 1 1 not provide the needs of the mi 1 i tary members who wi 1 1 man the
new bases. In order to maximize federal dollars spent to meet mission critical
elements of the plan, yet provide for mission essential elements of personnel
support functions, other financing methods must be found. These can include in
part: (1) third-party financing of conmand private sector functions (i.e. dining
facility, gym and recreational facilities); (2) commercial lease of existing
functions (i.e. warehousing, repair shops); (3) private sector housing through
various means of individual and government programs.
Market Housing
To carry out the Homeport at Staten Island, the Navy would berth seven ships
(battleship, cruiser, three destroyers , and two frigates) at the waterfront site.
Adjacent uplands would contain support facilites essential to the waterfront
operations. A relatively inactive Army base located one and one-half miles from
the waterfront would be the site of administrative, public works, warehousing and
personnel support, such as clinics and recreation functions.
Mi li tary Fami lies
The proposed Homeport has a personnel complement or baseloading estimated at
4,607 active duty military personnel. About 2,240 personnel would have families
based on the Navy Military Personnel Command annual estimate of families.
Furthermore about 11 percent of those with families choose to be voluntarily
separated for various reasons. These may include: sat ; sfaction with former
location and lifestyle, spouse employment, high cost of housing in new location,
and unwillingness to disrupt schooling for children. Thus about 2,002 personnel
would require housing in the New York Metropolitan area.
Available Military Family Housing Assets
There are currently 644 units of Navy family housing and 850 units of Army
family housing in the New York area, but such housing would not accomodate the
Homeport housing need. Navy personnel currently assigned to New York would occupy
most of the existing housing units, or the units would be beyond a reasonable
one-hour commuting time from the Staten Island site. Navy personnel would also
be assigned a priority below Army personnel for assignment to Army housing and
effectively have little opportunity to compete for assignment. Both services
currently have waiting lists in excess of 100 names.
Constraints on Demand
Market constraints on demand exist for both rental and for sale !iou5ing.
These constraints are not unique to the market area, but they must be considered
as serious impacts en military preferences.
Rental Housing Constraints
. Both financial and lease constraints exist.
Military members are often: unable to pay initial, up-front costs (security
deposits, first and last months rents plus realtor fees) after making a cress
country move. They may need short-term leases; subsidized housing has a waiting
list for periods longer than their tour of duty. In urban areas on-street parking
is not available or severly restricted.
Rent control represents another constraint on the rental market. Rent control
limits the amount by which a landlord may increase his rent each year. This
creates two problems for military families. First, the existing tenants tend to
stay in controlled units as long as possible, resulting in a 99 percent occupancy
rate. Second, the rent increases permitted for new lease renewals can be less
than the increased costs for utilities and repairs to the building. When the
permitted rent increase is below inflation, the buildings tend to be under
maintained.
Sale Housing Constraints . The demand constraints pertinent to sale housing
are largely financial . These include high interest rates, unwi llingness of sellers
to pay points on Veterans Administration (VA) mortgages, lack of down payment
money, and inability to pay closing costs.
Existing Remedies Available
Approximately 1,637 personnel will have a high degree of difficulty or be
unable to find affordable, suitable housing within the total market area. The
others, due to their seniority and accompanying pay levels will find suitable
quarters either through rental or purchase. Other remedies within the context
of programs and policies of the Navy including construction of military housing
or programs as addressed in the Supplemental EIS:
Military Construction . Construction of military family housing requires
Congressional approval. The SEIS proposed construction of 550 units at the
personnel support site for the Homeport.
im^nvk^iw^v'tii •w»v»v»ta.»w*www»w<
O Housing Referral Service (HRS)
.
HRS is a partial remedy in that it can provide
_ information and advice abGut vacant units to military personnel, assisting them
J
** to find residences that might not be listed with realtors. The SEIS recommended




Various policy changes to alleviate the housing deficit could be initiated
*« within the Navy and/or the Department of Defense.
Leasing of Existing Housing . One policy change would be to reintroduce the
i, leasing of existing units by the Navy in the Continential United States. New
York City presently has many vacant buildings, but is facing a severe homeless
} persons problem itself.
^
Section 801 Military Family Housing Leasing Program . This program provides
-, for housing to be constructed on or near military installations, by private
developers. Military departments can enter into long term leasing contracts (up
to 20 years, excluding construction) for units constructed to DOD standards. The
a
SEIS recommended construction of up to 1000 units on New York State owned land
>* near the personnel support site.
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1 1 . PROGRAM CONTEXT
The Fiscal Year 1984 Defense Authorization Bill (PL 98-115) included an
amendment to Section 801, 10 USC 2828 which provided for the military departments
to enter into a contract for the lease of family housing units to be constructed
on or near a military installation by a private developer. The lease period may
extend to a period of 20 years beyond the construction time. Subsequent guidance
from Congressional committees restricted these programs to non-federally owned
land.
Introduction
Real property taxes are a major component of the cost of operating housing.
New York City can therefore use its taxing power to offset the cost of providing
land for construction by private developers of Section 801 housing for the Navy.
The decision to select Staten Island as the site of the Northeast Surface Action
Group Homeport was strongly encouraged by political leaders of both New York City
and New York State. It was encouraged because of the perceived financial benefit
to the local economy.
As the result of a thorough search of New York City or State owned property,
a site of 110 acres (known as South Beach or Ocean View) was identified within 3
miles of the proposed Homeport community support base. The government orginally
hopes to have 1150 units of housing on this site. The land is currently owned by
the New York State Dormi tory Authori ty. It can be made avai lable to the City for
$4 million dollars to reduce debt service on bonds secured by the site. Because

















land, the federal government may not purchase the land. The cost of offsetting
the city's price for the land will greatly discourage private developers, thus,
the up front costs must be ameliorated in order to entice private developers.
The federal government has suggested that this $4 million dollar cost be forgiven
by the city in accordance with its prospects of incuring financial benefit from
the Homeport. The Section 801 Housing program can then be considered along the
lines of otner New York City incentives in order to stimulate housing investment
by the private sector.
Provisions
Section 801 of 10 USC 2828 permits the Secretrary of a military department
to enter into a contract for the lease of family housing units to be constructed
on or near a military installation within the United States at which there is a
validated deficit in family housing. Housing units under this subsection shall
be assigned, without rental charge, as family housing. Such a contract shall be
awarded through the use of public advertised, competitively bid or competitively
negotiated contracting procedures. The contract will provide for the contractor
v r *V / to operate and maintain such facilities during the term of the lease.
« Si
Any contract will be for a period of 20 years (excluding construction time).
At the end of the lease period, the United States shall have the right of first




A contract may not be entt'ed into by the United States until the Secretary
of Defense sutxni ts to the Congress an economi c ana lysis based on life cycle cost i ng
which demonstrates that the proposed contract is cost effective when compared to
1
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alternative means of furnishing the same housing facilities (either by government
construction or individual unit rentals on the open market).
Cost of Proposal . There is a maximum first year cost for shelter rent and
maintenance rent for this project. The maximum first year cost is
SR + 1.31 (MR) $2.58 million
SR = Shelter Rent reflects the cost of ownership to the proposer for newly
constructed facilities provided to the government over the term of the lease,
including, but not limited to the cost of improvements, property taxes, utility
connection fees, cost of borrowing money, and profits earned thereon. Shelter
rent shall be fixed for the twenty year period. One twentieth of that amount
shall be stated as the first year annual least cost;
MR = Maintenance Rent reflects the annual costs of providing operational
services, maintenance of the housing units and real property and repairs required
to maintain the complete facility for the term of the project lease. The
maintenance rent shall be adjusted at a rate pegged to the Housing, Shelter,
Maintenance and Repair Index for the proceeding twelve months of the "Economic
Indicators" prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of Congress Dy the Council
of Economic Advisors.
The relationship between SR and MR can be adjusted over the following graph of











Public Law 98-115 allowed for the establishment of this program as a test to
determine if leasing is more cost effective that alternative means of furnishing
the same housing. Economi c analysi s wi 1 1 be prepared and submi tted to the Congress
for review on each project.
C
,>
Tne FY 84 Defense Authorization Bill identified test cases to be conducted,
by each service at sites of their choice. The first two projects to be launched
were at Fort Drum, New York and Naval Weapons Station, Earle, New Jersey.
Among the assumptions or igi nal ly behind the proposal were the use of a modi f ied
turnkey process to simplify the specifications and bidding process, head to head
competition among those developers who specialize in larger developments and are
presumably more responsible, use of regional labor wages vice imposi t ion of Davi s-
Bacon Act on the contractor, and use of real estate contracts rather than the
cumbersome Federal Acquisition Regulations. These assumptions suggested that
this type of project would attract the best developers in the industry.
10
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The first projects hit immediate trouble when the use of federal land was
restricted by Congress. Even with the presumed benefits to the developer built
into the program, the cost of land to the developer discouraged their
participation. Though both sites are located in generally rural areas, with
presumed low land values, the bidding was disappointing. Only one bidder at Fort
Drum, and none at Earle. The Navy was forced to request Congressional approval
for re-bidding the project on government land.
In FY 1986 another case was chosen for New York. A two hundred unit, non-
site specific Request for Proposal did not receive any interest. For this reason,
the Navy then turned it's efforts to obtaining land, either from other federal
agencies as an inter-governmental transfer of property, or from state and city
government at no cost. With State and City assistance, an extensive study of
available parcels of land identified 110 acres witin a ten minute commute of the
proposed homeport support base.
It appears that the Congress must review its stipulation for use of non-
federal land if this program is to succeed. Private financing for construction
of government housing requires private sector returns. The government must be
willing to put up equity or financing for the developer. One form of equity would
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III. THE EVALUATION FRAVEVNDRK
Prorgam evaluation must be done in the context of program objectives.
Evaluation, however, should not be restricted only to the orginal objectives,
since the needs of the community change over time, with existing programs serving
new objectives of governmental policy.
Program Objectives
The Section 801 Housing Program was originally proposed as an alternative
means of providing government Family Housing for military families.
Traditionally, family housing has been provided as a captial investment through
the Military Construction provisions of the annual Appropriations and
Authorization Bills passed by Congress each year.
However the mood of the Congress has been to restrict government involvement
in areas which it sees as more of a responsibility of the private sector. Even
when the need for construction of housing is apparent, each individual proposal
must compete with other proposals equally as valid. Subsidizing of middle income
housing is a controversial objective of government. However, if a subsidy is
viewed as not an end in itself, but as a means of stimulating the production of
housing and the local economy as a whole, and if the stimulation is strong enough,
the initial subsidy will actually be repaid through the generation of additional
proper ty ,' sales , and income taxes. Financial assistance turns out not to be a
subsidy on the part of the government but rather an efficient investment that not
only pays for itself, but also benefits the private sector as well.
12
In order to determine if an 801 project is an investment for the city, for
example, whether the initial subsidy in the form of land at no cost for the
developer is eventually recouped, a fiscal impact analysis is required. Tne
analysis must first outline the costs (city income foregone) incurred and benefits
(tax revenue created) of the program from the New York City coffers. The model
is then developed quani tati vely , employing hypothetical parameters based whenever
possible on actual data available. Where no actual data is available, best
assumptions are made about costs and benefits.
Program Costs
The costs inherent in a program such as 801 are both quantitive, in terms of
actual revenue "lost" and municipal service costs to new residents, and
qualitative, in terms of negative effects on the supply of middle income housing.
Critics may maintain that much of the affected housing would have been built in
the private sector for the Navy personnel in the absence of the program. If so,
in the absence of governmental support, then the city would bear a cost of forgone
tax revenues to subsidize owners or tenants. In addition, if new projects came
from the demolition of previously occupied buildings or displacement of existing
tenants in rehabbed units, then this would result in further economic burdens on
the city.
Program Benef i ts
The potential streams of benefits may be substantial. Assessed values of
currently vacant real property are increased so that revenues in the form of real
property taxes to the city are genereted. A large number of middle income
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households are added to the city generating additional income and sales taxes for
the city. Spending by these households could lead to an expansion of commercial
space in the immediate area of the site, and increased property tax revenues.
However, the increase in people and expansion of commercial space increases also
the level and cost of municipal services, partially offsetting these benefits.
The actual spending on construction will generate not only employment
opportunities in the local economy, but also sales and income tax revenues to the
city, subject of course, to some loss when spending goes to workers who are not
city residents or for goods purchased outside of the city. Additionally, some
income tax will be lost as many military families maintain their home state as
official homes of residence, subject to taxation from the home state.
Likewise, subsidized new construction may create neighborhood externalties
that actually induce the upgrading of adjacent parcels without any additional
subsidies. Finally, any spending on construction or by tenants that would not
have taken place in the absence of subsidies generates multiplier effects on
income and employment as initial spending is respent by receipients so that tax
revenues to the city are multiplied upward from secondary sales, income, and
property tax generation.
The cost and benefits to the city discussed above are summarized as Table 3-1.
Total Program Impact
The analysis of the fiscal impacts of the 801 program has been undertaken
using assunptions of the program's ability both to induce Navy families to move
to New YorkCitywith themilitary member , and to i nduce developers to bui Id uni ts
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that otherwise may not have been constructed. The net fiscal impact is establ ished
as the present discounted value of costs and benefitts for the period 1986 through
2005. An 8 percent discount rate is applied to all future costs and revenues to
determine the present discounted value as of 1986.
Injections of income and sales taxes from military households moving to the
city as a result of the homeporting program, real estate taxes generated from
expansion of commercial space to meet additional spending by these households,
and the cost of added municipal services for these households are included. For
units that would not have been built, the induced constuction spending will
generate multiplier effects to the extent that it goes into and out of the pocket
of other city residents and firms. There multiplier effects are also included
in the analysis.
Upgrading effects on adjacent parcels are not taken into effect because it
requires an extended analysis beyond the limits of this study.
Alternative assumptions are made about the percentage of units induced by the
program, and whether or not expansion of municipal services and commercial space
occurs as a result of occupancy by households that would not otherwise enter the
city. While marginal increases in the number of households can be accomodated
wi th gi ven commercial and municipal services , after a certain point it is necessary
to expand facilities. Because the point at whch expansion becomes necessary is
unknown, calculations are made with and without these long run effects.
The primary determinant of program impact depends on whether the unit would
have been built in the absence of the cost of land. For units which would have
15
been bui 1 t even wi th the land cost , the net impact on the ci ty would be the i ni t i al
cost of the land versus the increased assessed value of the parcels. Even though
such units may attract some military families, the number of units may not be
large enough without the program to represent an offset to forgo the cost of the
land.
Oily those units which would not have been built in the absence of the land
cost offset are capable of generating revenues for the city beyond what the free
market would have provided. Hence, the total number of units needed for military
families arriving to support the new base, the breakdown for providing housing is
as follows.
Total number required: 2002 families
Provided by: Military Construction: 550 families
Private Sector: 302 families
Section 801: 1150 families
16
TABLE 3-1




Taxes generated through income and sales
by families that would not otherwise reside
in the city
Added cost of municipal services
for families who would not
otherwise reside in the city
Property taxes generated by expansion of
commercial facilities to meet additional
spending
Administrative costs Real estate taxes generated on upgraded
adjacent parcels
Sale and income taxes generated by
construction spending
Taxes generated by multiplier effects of
construction spending and spending by










IV. DETERMINING FISCAL IMPACT
This chapter describes the calculations necessary to compute the fiscal impact
as presented in Table 3-1. Determination of the following items is included:
^. 1. Real estate taxes created due to the subsidy
? 2. Generation of tax revenues through induced construction spending.
*• 3. Generation of tax revenues through multiplier effects of induced
L-"' construction spending.
b
4. Net injection of sales and income taxes by an induced resident.
5. Generation of tax revenues through mul tiplier effects of net spending by
% induced residents.
6. Generation of real property taxes through expansion of commercial space
due to spending by induced residents.
7. Estimation of the per capita cost of common municipal services.
_- The analysis is based on the assumption that a dwelling unit's assessed value
* increases $20,000, that construction costs per unit total $55,650, and the typical
£> military household in residence comprises two adults whose gross income before
w
taxes is $25,000, and whose monthly rent (paid by government as part of the lease
cost) is $900.
Real Estate Taxes Created Due to Subsidy
Table 4-1 details the calculations required to establish taxes created for a
unit that would not have been built in the absence of the 801 program.
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It is assumed that the subsidy is the reason the construction was completed.
It must also be assumed that no new taxes on increased assessed values would have
occurred without the program because obviously there would not have been an
increase in assessed value.
The present discounted value per unit of taxes generated is equal to $22,384
over the twenty year life of the project.
The calculations are based on nominal real estate tax of $9.00 per $100 market
value, although properties within the city are substantially undervalued for
assessment purposes. The "official" New York equalized tax rate is $4.50 per
$100 market value. An increase in rate of .5% per annum for the first five years
is projected but assumed to remain at 11% per $100 of assessed value for the
remaining 15 years. An 8 percent discount rate is employed.
Generation of Tax Revenues Through Induced Construction Spending
It is estimated that the construction costs of a typical uni t are approximately
$55,650.
Construction spending on labor and materials not only stimulates the local
economy, but also contributes direct tax revenues through taxation of the 'nitial
round of spending and through taxation of additional spending due to multiplier
effects. The Fiscal Impact Analysis assumes that 45% of the costs for labor will
go to New York City residents, and 55% to non-residents. Because of New York
City's sale tax, it is also assumed that only one third of costs for materials
is made wi thin the ci ty . A 1969 study by Mckinsey and Company for New York Ci ty
19
shows that historically construction costs are divided into 40% for labor, 45%
for materials, and 15% for overhead and profit.
Given these parameters, the total tax contribution of the initial spending
on construction is equal to $896 per unit. See Table 4-2.
Generation of Tax Revenues Through Multiplier Effects
of Induced Construction Spending
With a cost of $55,650 per dwelling unit, and assuming a local multiplier of
1.67 in secondary and tertiary spending, the induced income generation is another
$32,285. It is estimated that 8 percent of local spending returns to the city as
tax revenues through sales, income or property tax. This 8 percent figure is
based on analysis of the typical household budget of 801 housing residents. Hence,
induced spending effects eventually generate $2,583 in tax revenues.
This multiplier from construction spending does not work immediately, but
rather, over the life of the construction period. To get the present value, the
revenues are spread over three years and discounted back to present value using
the 8 percent discount rate.
The result is a contribution of $2,396 to the fiscal impact of any unit that
would not otherwise have been built. See Table 4-3.
20
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Net Injection of Sales and Income Taxes by an Induced Resident
The typical military family living in 801 housing will bo composed of two
adults earning a total annual income of $25,000, before taxes.
Income Tax
The first tasks in deriving probable income tax payments is to estimate what
proportion of Navy personel being assigned to New York is expected to be residents
of New York State. Under New York State law, only those military personnel
assigned to New York who are State residents have a State and City income tax
liability. Two methods can be applied to estimate the likely proportion of State
residents:
1. Survey current Navy personnel assigned in the New York City area.
2. Survey Navy personnel assigned to ships similiar to those being
homeported.
A survey of Navy personnel assigned in New York City in 1984 indicated
approximately 35 percent to be New York State residents.
A survey of ships in Norfolk, Virginia in 1985 indicated that up to one third
of all personnel were New York residents prior to joining the Navy, but many have
changed their residency since joining. Taking this into account, an average of
25 percent is used to determine New York State residents among all those assigned




Of the 2000 families expected to be assigned in the New York area, the 500
Ne* York State residents will pay an average of $318 income tax. Table 4-4 is
derived from the Fiscal Impact Analysis and is based on an estimate considering
the following adjustments: the number of dependents, other deductions and
»**
household credit. It also excludes income of spouses not legal residents of New
a
»'«! York City but residing in the city. Despite their City residency, according to
- City tax regulations they would pay commuter tax rates. These commuter rates are
3
.45 percent of income, however, it is nearly impossible to estimate the number
y of non-resident spouses who may be employed, so it is not included in this
calculation.
8
Using the 25 percent number of New York residents assigned in the New York
City area, it is estimated that 288 of the 801 housing residents may have New
York State residency. Or, another w&y of stating this would be that the average
New York State income tax paid by all 801 housing residents is $80 (25% of $318).
n Sales Tax
:.• Sales taxes are closely linked to income; as income rises, so do taxable
'y
purchases. However, the sales tax is mildly regressive and tax collections do
\ not rise at the same rate as income.
'/,
u
Mi 1 i tary personnel di f fer from ci vi
1
ian counterparts in that they may purchase
goods at a Post Exchange (PX), and those goods are not subject to a sales tax.
Since New York City has such a competitive retail market, a considerable portion
22
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of purchases are still likely to be made in commercial businesses except for high
tax items such as cigarettes and alcoholic beverages. Also, PX shopping is more
convenient. It is assumed that 25% of all sales will be in the PX, and 75% in
private stores.
Next to be considered is the fact that most Navy personnel will not be in
homeport for up to 5 months each year. This assumes that married personnel or
their families will purchase up to 90 percent of their taxable goods in New York
City. An adjustment of 1.26 is added to reflect the consumer purchases of
automobiles and other major items which are not o.uantified.
The resident family sales tax per unit is $223. See Table 4-5.
Net injection of sales and income taxes by an induced resident total $303 ($80
+ $223). If income and expenditures grow at roughly 4 percent (average value of
inflation over past year), the present discounted value of the flow over 20 years
is equal to $4,329, using an 8 percent discount factor. See Table 4-6.
Generation of Tax Revenues Through Multiplier
Effects of Net Spending by Induced Residents
In addition to taxes generated by the household spending in New York City,
multiplier effects of this spending within the local economy will also result in
increased city revenues. It is assumed that 60% of the average household income
will be injected into local spending, exclusive of all taxes. This gives $15,000,
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to which a multiplier of 1.67 is added. The result is a stream of $10,050
additional spending in the conmuni ty . At an assumption that 8 percent of
expenditures ends up in sales, income or property taxes, the result of such
spending is $804. in tax revenues for the city.
Such a stream would be generated each year. Assuming expenditures grow at 9
percent and an 8 percent discount factor, the present value of the multiplier
effects is $11,507. See Table 4-7.
Generation of Real Property Taxes Through Expansion
of Commercial Space Due to Spending by Induced Residents
Expanded conmercial activity will result in an expansion of conmercial space,
which will provide additional revenues to the city through payment of property
taxes. Since New York City has the largest concentration of conmercial activity
in the United States, business taxes comprise an important element in the City's
revenue structure. A considerable share of added commercial activity stimulated
by development is subject to local taxes, and the city revenues grow.
To estimate the effect of added household outlay on property taxes paid by
business, the first task is to determine the extent to which resident households
contribute to commercial activity. Retail business in Staten Island can be
expected to expand its selling and storage space in response to purchases by Navy
fami 1 ies.
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If the flow of property tax revenues grows at 5 percent for the first five
years due to increases in the property tax rates, stabilizing after five years,
the present discounted value of this stream of property taxes discounted back at
8 percent equals $5,119 per unit. See Table 4-9.
Estimating the Per Capita Cost of Common Municipal Services
It is difficult to determine at just what point additional housholds begin
to cause the expansion of common municipal services. It is probably a step
function in which the cost and level of services remain constant over a certain
range and then take a discrete jump to a higher level. However, such functions
can be approximated by a curve and, if the long run average cost curve of municipal
services tends to be in a range of minimum long run average costs, then the
approximate long run marginal costs of services can be determined on a per capita
long run costs.
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Table 4-8 lists real property catagories, their assessed values and assessed
values allocated per city household. About 49% of all business property is
estimated to be directly linked to city household ir?ome. Thus, the typical New
York City household is responsible for about $5,132 in assessed value of business
property, and this business property pays $472 in real property taxes to the city.
However, Navy households, primarily because of their lower income and non-private
sector purchases of some goods and services, are expected to have a lesser impact
on business property than the typical New York City household. It is assumed
that this impact will be about two-thirds of the city household average or $3,335,
for $306 allocated per household.
Data on the FY 84 budgetary outlays for New York City are used to determine
the per capita cost of common services. In FY 84, the budget outlays totaled
almost $17 million. Approximately 63 percent of all expenditures are net from
revenue collected by New York City and unrestricted state and Federal funds
(primarily through revenue sharing). The share of Federal and state payments
differ by category. See Table 4-10.
Although most major services are utilized by households, some are used more
Although most major services are utilized by households, some are used more
directly by both households and business enterprizes. These services include
(public safety, utilities, transportation and general government). Police and
fire protection are provided to residents, commuters, and businesses, trucks and
personal cars use the city streets. The majority of the services, including
social services, schools, and hospitals, are used almost exclusively by households
and are allocated to households. The common municipal services which are starred
(*) are used to determine per capita costs.
The total city shares of common services are estimated to be $7,195 million
dollars. The city population based on Bureau of Census statistics for 1984 was
7,086,000. The average 1984 per capita outlays is thus $1,015, or $2,030 per
household. Based on a 4 percent per year increase, the 1986 per capita outlay
wi 11 be $2,196.
If these costs are expected to continue to grow at 4 percent per year, and
are discounted back at 8 percent per year, the present value of outlays over the
life of the contract is $31,394. See Table 4-11.
26
TABLE 4-1
REAL PROPERTY TAXES GENERATED
DISCOUNTED PRESENT
INCREASE IN TAX TAXES VALUE OF TAXES
YEAR .ASSESSED VALUE RATE GENERATED GENERATED
$20,000 .09 $1800 $1800
1 $20,000 .095 $1900 $1759
2 $20,000 .100 $2000 $1714
3 $20,000 .105 $2100 $1667
4 $20,000 $2200/year $1617
5 $20,000 $2200/year $1497
6 $20,000 $2200/year $1386
7 $20,000 $2200/year $1283
i $20,000 $2200/year $1188
9 $20,000 $2200/year $1100
10 $20,000 $2200/year $1018
11 $20,000 $2200/year $943
12 $20,000 $2200/year $873
13 $20,000 $2200/year $808
14 $20,000 $2200/year $748
15 $20,000 $2200/year $693
16 $20,000 $2200/year $642
17 $20,000 $2200/year $594
18 $20,000 $2200/year $550




ESTIMATED TAX REVENUES GENERATED DIRECTLY FROM INDUCED CONSTRUCTION SPENDING
Estimated Construction Cost $55,650
Labor Cost: .40 X $55,650 = $22,260
A. Labor Income to City Residents
.45 x $22,260 = $10,017
Income Taxes paid on Labor Income by City Residents
.016 x $10,017
B. Labor Income to Non-residents
.55 x $22,260 = $12,243
Income Taxes paid on Labor Income by Non-residents
.0045 x $12,243
Cost of Materials: .45 x $55,650 = $25,042
Material purchased in city = .33 x $25,042 = $8,264








DETEKVfl NATION OF PRESENT VALUE OF TAX REVENUES DERIVED FROM MULTIPLIER EFFECTS
OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS
Estimated Construction Cost = $55,650/unit
With Local multiplier added $92,935
Induced income generated $32,285
Local spending returned to city













Multiplier effects result from the fact that an intitial injection of spending
will be respent. Multiplier effects are usually expressed in terms of jobs or
added expenditures to the direct job or expense. As each round of respending
occurs, the rounds become smaller because of leakages to savings, f axes, etc.
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TABLE 4-4








$11,250 91 35 3.2
$13,750 21 86 1.8
$16,250 83 149 12.4
$18.75(1 69 221 15.2
$21,250 31 300 9.3
$23,750 52 426 22 .
2
$27,500 54 559 30.2
$32,500 30 858 25.7
$37,500 19 1051 20.
$45,000 7 1341 9.4
$60,000 5 li?Ji 9.6
500 $318 $159,000
@ = From Stapleton Horoeport Fiscal Ircpact Analysis , April 1986
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TABLE 4-5
NEW YORK CITY SALES TAX PAID BY MILITARY HOUSEHOLDS^
AVERAGE SALES ADJ SALES
NO. INCOME TAX ADJUSTMENT TAX
1840 $25,000 $177 1.26 $223,
@ = From Stapleton Homeport Fiscal Impact Analysis , April 1986
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TABLE 4-6
DETERVn NATION OF PRESENT VALUE Of SALES AND ING3VE TAXES
YEAR TAXES (1.04)C x (irb>
$303 1.000 1.000
1 $303 1.040 .9259
2 $303 1.0816 .8573
3 $303 1.1248 .7938
4 $303 1.1648 .7350
5 $303 1.2166 .6805
6 $303 1.2653 .6301
7 $303 1.3159 .5834
8 $303 1.3685 .5402
9 $303 1.4233 .5000
10 $303 1.4802 .4631
11 $303 1.5394 .4288
12 $303 1.6010 .3971
13 $303 1.6650 .367 6
14 $303 1.7316 .3484
15 $303 1.8009 .3152
16 $303 1.8729 .2918
17 $303 1.9479 .2702
18 $303 2.0258 .2502

























YEAR SPENDING (1.04) x \UQi) PRESENT VALUE
$804 1.000 1.000 $804
1 $804 1.040 .9259 $774
2 $804 1.0816 .8572 $745
3 $804 1.1248 .7938 $717
4 $804 1.1648 .7350 $691
5 $804 1.2166 .6805 $665
6 $804 1.2653 .6301 $641
7 $804 1.3159 .5834 $617
8 $804 1.3685 .5402 $594
9 $804 1.4233 .5000 $572
10 $804 1.4802 .4631 $551
11 $804 1.5394 .4288 $531
12 $804 1.6010 .3971 $511
13 $804 1.6650 .3676 $492
14 $804 1.7316 .3484 $485
15 $804 1.8009 .3152 $456
16 $804 1.8729 .2918 $439
17 $804 1.9479 .2702 $423
18 $804 2.0258 .2502 $407
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TABLE 4-3
































































REAL PROPERTY TAX ALLOCATED PER HOUSEHOLD
$5137 X .092 = $473
@ From City of New York Comprehensive Annual Financial Report of the Controller
for FY 84
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TABLE 4-3
DETERMINATION OF PRESENT VALUE OF REAL ESTATE TAXES OF EXPANDED CGVIVIERCIAL SPACE





























































































































































195 COMMON MUNICIPAL SERVICES
$10,694$16,975
© From City or New York Executive Budget For FY 85
+ Includes buildings, General government, and economic development
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TABLE 4-11
DETEHVn NATION OF PRESENT VALUE OF COVM3N MUNICIPAL SERVICES COSTS
/ 1 \ t
YEAR COST (1.04) t x ( lTU? ; PRESENT VALUE
$2196 1.00 1.00 $2196
1 $2196 1.04 .9259 $2115
2 $2196 1.081 .8573 $2035
3 $2196 1.124 .7938 $1959
4 $2196 1.109 .7350 $1883
5 $2196 1.216 .6805 $1817
6 $2196 1.265 .6301 $1750
7 $2196 1.315 .5834 $1684
8 $2196 1.368 .5402 $1622
9 $2196 1.423 .5000 $1562
10 $2196 1.480 .4631 $1505
11 $2196 1.539 .4288 $1449
12 $2196 1.601 .3971 $1396
13 $2196 1.665 .3676 $1344
14 $2196 1.731 .3404 $1294
15 $2196 1.801 .3152 $1246
16 $2196 1.872 .2918 $1199
17 $2196 1.947 .2702 $1155
18 $2196 2.025 .2502 $1112
19 $2196 2.106 .2317 $1071
$31,394
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V. CONCLUSION: THE TOTAL IMPACT
Introduction
The results of the proceeding analysis can be combined in various cases to
establish the overall impact on the city of New York for subsidizing the cost of
land in order to implement the 801 program.
Al ternati ves
Case 1: The units would not have been built in the absence of the land cost
subsidy, and the Navy personnel would still have resided within the
ci ty.
Case 2a: The units would have not been built in the absence of the land cost
subsidy, and the Navy personnel would have resided outside the city.
No additional commercial space would be generated and no additional
cost of municipal services would be required.
Case 2b: Same as 2a above, except that commercial space would be generated and
munici pal services costs would be incurred as a result of an equivalent
household expansion and commercial expansion.
Case 2c: Same as 2b above, except that multiplier effects from construction
spending and from spending of induced residents is added to the
analysi s.
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Case 1 considers only the cost of property taxes and the direct tax impact of
construction for units that would not have otherwise been built without the land
cost subsidy, but 'where the Navy personnel would still have lived wi thin the ci ty
.
The impact of the program then is only from the taxes generated if the houses are
constructed. Since the Navy personnel would live inthe city anyway, any taxes
from them would still be collected.
Case 2a includes the same benefits as Case 1, but also includes the net injection
of sales and income taxes by the induced households who would not have otherwise
located in units that would not have been built except for the land cost being
subsidized.
Case 2b includes the long term effects of the in-niigration of the induced residents.
The property tax revenues accruing from the expansion of the commercial space,
and the costs of added common municipal services which the city must provide.
The average expenditures on common municipal services per capita in order to meet
the needs of increased population and business are used.
Case 2c adds to Case 2b the indirect program benefits resulting f rom mul tipl ier
effects of initial construction spending and spending by households that would
not have otherwise located in the city.
The Total Impact
The fiscal impact per unit is listed in Table 5-1 for all cases. The net sum
of the costs and benefits determines the net fiscal impact for each case.
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Case 1 is the most pessimistic assumption, for example, even had the units
been built without the subsidized cost of land, the Navy personnel assigned in
New York woula find housing elsewhere within the city. The city would still
benefit in property taxes and construction spending in the amount of $23,285.
However , the purpose of the 801 program i s to induce mi 1 i tary fami lies into private
sector housing in the immediate area of the military installation. The parcel
of land identified for this program has been vacant for 15 years, during which
time the borough of Staten Island has been the only one of the five city boroughs
to show an increase in populations and housing new starts. The fact that neither
the state nor the city has been able to put the land to a profitable use indicates
that the cost for the land makes private development prohibitive.
Under the most optimistic example, Case 2c, that the land cost subsidy would
allow development which would benefit military families, hence expanding
commercial space through induced spending, and providing multiplier effects for
construction spending as well as induced spending, the fiscal impact of a unit
still results in a benefit of $15,242. For the total project site of 1150 units,
the net present value is in excess of $17.5 million dollars. This more than
offsets the $4 million dollar cost for the land which the city would subsidize.
i
Therefore, the conclusion is that under the most reasonable assumptions, the
subsidized cost of the land for the 801 program by the city more than pays for
itself. That these assumptions are reasonable is based on the fact that they
have been conservative throughout the analysis of impacts. Low levels of ability
to stimulate new growth, low construction - generated revenues and secondary tax
impacts, and a low propensity to consume locally (multiplier) have all been used.
Likewise, the marginal cost of common municipal services has been assumed to be
equal to the long run average cost of services.
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TABLE 5-1
PER UNIT FISCAL IMPACT OF THE 801 PROGRAM UNDER ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS
(PRESENT DISCOUNTED VALUE 1986-2005)
FISCAL EFFECT 2a 2b 2c
1. REAL ESTATE TAXES
CREATED $22,389 $22,389 $22,389 $22,389
2. TAXES THROUGH INDUCED
CONSTRUCTION SPENDING $896 $896 $896 $896
3. NET SALES AND INCOME
TAXES FROM INDUCED
RESIDENTS $4329 $4329 $4329
4. REAL ESTATE TAXES ON
EXPANDED CCMVERCIAL
SPACES
5. ADOED PER HOUSEHOLD
COST OF CGMVDN SERVICES
$5119 $5119
-$31,394 -$31,394
6. MULTIPLIER EFFECTS OF
INDUCED CONSTRUCTION $2396
7 . MULTI PLI ER EFFECT OF
INDUCED RESIDENT SPENDING
8. PER UNIT NET
FISCAL IMPACT
$11,507
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